Tiawan Saye Gongloe
Assistant Professor of Law
The Constitution of the Republic of Liberia places no branch of government above the law—not the Executive, not the Judiciary, and not the Legislature. Every public official, including the President, remains subject to constitutional limits and accountable to the rule of law. Any suggestion, practice, or posture to the contrary threatens the very foundation of Liberia’s constitutional democracy.
Recent events surrounding the Senate’s reaction to an attempted audit have brought this principle into sharp focus. After the Minister of Justice applied to a court for subpoenas to compel the production of documents requested by the General Auditing Commission (GAC) in order to conduct a full audit of the Senate, the Minister later withdrew the application. Yet, despite this withdrawal, the Senate proceeded to cite the Minister. This sequence of events raises serious constitutional concerns that are not personal or political, but institutional and legal.
The General Auditing Commission is statutorily mandated to audit public institutions, including the Legislature. Public funds are not the private property of any branch; they are resources held in trust for the people of Liberia. Transparency in the use of those funds is therefore not a favor to citizens but a legal obligation. When questions arise over the production of documents or compliance with an audit, the proper arena for resolving such disputes is the Judiciary. The Ministry of Justice acted appropriately by going to court. Once the application for subpoenas was withdrawn, there was no live legal controversy—it became a moot matter.
For the Senate to respond to a withdrawn judicial application by citing the Minister of Justice sends the wrong signal. It appears less like constitutional oversight and more like institutional retaliation, especially in light of the Legislature’s past use of contempt powers, including the imprisonment of public officials. In this instance, the Ministry of Justice did no wrong to the Senate; therefore, the Senate was owed no apology. The Senate is not above the law.
Liberia’s history of instability, national fragmentation, and delayed progress is deeply tied to repeated disregard for the rule of law. Whenever state institutions assert authority in ways that undermine clearly established legal processes, constitutional alarm is not only appropriate—it is necessary. Democracy does not thrive on raw displays of power; it survives on disciplined adherence to constitutional boundaries.
These tensions are not abstract to me; I have confronted them in office. As Solicitor General, I oversaw the indictment of two sitting Senators—one for a first-degree felony, the other for a second-degree felony. I was summoned before the Senate and questioned for nearly two hours on why the Ministry of Justice would indict Senators when “such action did not happen in the past.” My answer was simple and consistent: the Constitution does not place Senators above the law. If no Senator had been indicted before, it could only mean that previous Senators had not broken the law—not that they were immune from it.
In one of these cases, a Senator was indicted for aggravated assault against his niece. During the Senate questioning, a member asked why a Senator should face indictment for assaulting “his own niece.” I explained that criminal law exists to protect life and bodily integrity as matters of public concern, not private family choice. Even attempted suicide, if unsuccessful, can amount to a criminal offense because the State has a duty to protect life. Life is not a private possession that can be harmed at will and shielded from public law. The Government of Liberia has a constitutional obligation to protect the life of every citizen and resident. After that exchange, I was discharged. The Senate was reminded, in practice, that it is not beyond the reach of the law.
A similar boundary issue arose when I served as Minister of Labor. I was cited by the Speaker of the House of Representatives over Regulation No. 17, which increased work permit fees. When I arrived, I found foreign entrepreneurs seated with the Speaker, objecting to the regulation. I informed the Speaker that if these businesspeople believed their rights were violated, the proper forum for redress was the Judiciary, not the Legislature. In reaction, the House passed a resolution of no confidence in me and forwarded it to President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf. The President responded that her Minister had broken no law and that she retained full confidence in him. That ended the matter, and once again the principle was clear: legislative displeasure cannot override constitutional processes.
These experiences highlight a central constitutional truth: public officials must respect and respond to legislative summons, but compliance does not mean surrendering constitutional judgment. When appearing before the Legislature, officials must remain anchored in their statutory duties and constitutional obligations. Legislative contempt powers, important as they are, do not supersede the Constitution.
The Supreme Court has already clarified the limits of legislative contempt. In Morlu II v. House of the Senate LRSC 19 (28 June 2008), Morlu filed a petition for prohibition after the Senate held him in contempt for issuing a press statement that the Senate claimed misinformed the international community. The Court ruled against the Senate, holding that even if Morlu had spread misinformation, his actions did not obstruct legislative functions or interfere with members or officers of the Senate in discharging their duties. The Court made clear that legislative contempt exists to protect the integrity of legislative proceedings, not to shield the Legislature from lawful criticism or scrutiny, and not as a tool of institutional retaliation. Contempt powers are bounded by the Constitution and subject to judicial review.
The fact that the Legislature is mentioned first in the Constitution does not make it superior to the other branches. That ordering is structural, not hierarchical. The doctrine of separation of powers creates coordination and mutual accountability under law, not supremacy of one branch over another. When the Executive exceeds its authority, the courts can correct it. When the Legislature exceeds its authority, the courts can correct it. When the Judiciary errs, appellate review provides correction. That is how constitutional democracy is designed to function.
True institutional strength is measured not by how loudly a branch can assert its authority, but by how faithfully it respects constitutional limits—even when doing so is inconvenient or politically uncomfortable. Actions that appear to bypass or punish lawful processes risk eroding public confidence in governance and feeding the perception that some actors operate above the law.
No chamber of the Legislature is above the law. No Minister is above the law. No citizen is above the law. Not even the President of the Republic is above the law.
The Senate is not above the law.
