In the charged atmosphere of public debate, where social media outrage often travels faster than legal reasoning, a central question continues to confront Liberia’s democracy: Does press freedom protect everything said in the name of criticism?
According to Cllr. Arthur T. Johnson, the answer is unequivocal—no. His argument does not seek to narrow free speech. Instead, it seeks to clarify it. At the heart of his exposition lies a single doctrinal distinction: the difference between accusation and abuse. In 2019, Liberia enacted the Kamara Abdullah Kamara Act, a landmark reform that repealed several provisions of the 1978 Penal Law. Among the repealed sections were: Section 11.11 – Criminal Libel Against the President, Section 11.12 – Sedition, Section 11.14 – Criminal Malevolence.
For decades, these provisions criminalized certain criticisms directed at the President and other public officials. The repeal marked a historic step in strengthening democratic discourse. Journalists and citizens could no longer face imprisonment merely for accusing a sitting President or public official of wrongdoing.
But as Johnson emphasizes, repeal does not mean recklessness
The Act was crafted to prevent the criminalization of political accusation—not to legitimize insult, profanity, intimidation, or harassment. “Government officials did not assume office to endure abuse or insult,” he writes. “They may be subject to criticism. Criticism differs from abuse.”
The Constitutional Anchor
The authority for the Kamara Act flows directly from Article 15 of Liberia’s 1986 Constitution, which guarantees freedom of speech while simultaneously imposing accountability for its misuse. The constitutional framework is not absolute libertarianism; it is responsible liberty.
In other words, speech is protected—but not immune from consequence.
An accusation, even if later proven inaccurate, is no longer criminal under the repealed provisions. However, defamatory speech may still trigger civil liability under tort law. Moreover, conduct that crosses into coercion, threats, or harassment remains prosecutable under existing criminal statutes. This is the boundary Johnson insists must be understood.
Accusation Versus Abuse: A Legal Fault Line
To accuse is to allege wrongdoing. It is an assertion that can be examined, defended, disproved, or litigated. To abuse is to demean, insult, or deploy profane language with the intent to degrade. That is not criticism; it is conduct.
Johnson underscores that the pivotal word in the Kamara Act is “accuse.” The statute does not say that citizens are free to insult, degrade, or harass public officials. It removes criminal penalties for accusations—not for misconduct disguised as speech.
Where abusive language becomes threatening or coercive, Liberia’s Penal Law remains fully operative. Chapter 14 addresses criminal coercion and harassment, including threats intended to compel action, repeated intimidation, and communications designed to provoke ridicule or damage professional standing. Free speech does not extinguish these statutes.
When Speech Becomes Contempt
The debate grows even more serious when the target is the Judiciary. Liberian law recognizes contempt of court as an inherent judicial power necessary to protect the authority, dignity, and orderly administration of justice. The Supreme Court of Liberia has consistently affirmed that contempt authority does not depend on legislative permission; it is intrinsic to judicial power.
Johnson carefully distinguishes between civil and criminal contempt:
Civil contempt is coercive. It compels compliance with a court order. The contemnor “holds the keys” to release because compliance ends the sanction. Criminal contempt is punitive. It punishes conduct that obstructs justice or demeans the court’s authority. It requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
Importantly, criminal contempt does not require that the act occur inside a courtroom. Public insults directed at a Justice, deliberate acts undermining the integrity of judicial proceedings, or publications that obstruct ongoing cases may constitute contempt.
In Firestone Plantations Co. v. Republic of Liberia, the Court held that criminal contempt exists “to uphold the authority and restore the dignity of the court.” In In re Parker, the Court exercised its inherent power when an individual publicly insulted a Justice. These precedents reinforce a central principle: criticism is lawful; contempt is punishable.
The Repeal and Its Limits
The repeal of criminal libel, sedition, and malevolence removed criminal penalties for accusations against the President and other officials. It did not repeal laws governing coercion, harassment, or disorderly conduct.
Nor did it eliminate civil remedies. A public official who believes an accusation is false and malicious may pursue a libel or slander action in civil court. The shift was from criminal prosecution to civil accountability—not from accountability to immunity.
Johnson warns against a widespread misconception: that the Kamara Act created an unrestricted speech environment. It did not. Instead, it recalibrated Liberia’s democratic balance. It ensured that political dissent would not be jailed, while preserving legal tools to address intimidation, coercion, and institutional degradation.
Democracy Requires Discipline
Liberia’s constitutional democracy depends on two simultaneous commitments: robust criticism and institutional respect.
Public officials must tolerate scrutiny. Citizens must exercise responsibility. Courts must maintain authority. The press must remain fearless—but disciplined.
The distinction Johnson presses is therefore not semantic. It is structural. Confusing accusation with abuse risks destabilizing the equilibrium between liberty and order. Press freedom is a shield against criminal repression. It is not a sword for personal attack. And in that difference lies the future integrity of Liberia’s democratic experiment.
